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ABSTRACT 
Biological market theory has in recent years become an important part of the 
social evolutionist’s toolkit. This article discusses the explanatory potential 
and pitfalls of biological market theory in the context of big picture accounts 
of the evolution of human cooperation and morality. I begin by assessing an 
influential account that presents biological market dynamics as a key driver 
of the evolution of fairness norms in humans. I argue that this account is 
problematic for theoretical, empirical, and conceptual reasons. After 
mapping the evidential and explanatory limits of biological market theory, I 
suggest that it can nevertheless fill a lacuna in an alternative account of 
hominin evolution. Trade on a biological marketplace can help explain why 
norm-based cooperation did not break down when our late-Pleistocene 
ancestors entered new, challenging social and economic environments. 
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1 Introduction 
Biological market theory (BMT) aims to explain the evolution and stability of cooperation 
by reference to ecological equivalents of economic market effects. After a slow start in the 
1990s, BMT has in recent years become an influential framework for the study of social 
evolution, having drawn support from further theoretical and empirical studies. BMT’s rather 
quiet ascent compared to the tumultuous debates over group- and kin-selection theory might 
help explain why it has received little to no attention in philosophical discussions of social 
evolution (Birch [2017]; Okasha [2006]).1⁠ This paper aims to show that BMT merits close 
philosophical scrutiny, particularly in relation to ‘big picture’ accounts of the evolution of 
hominin cooperation and morality.  
The present article focuses on one such comprehensive account, as developed by Nicolas 
Baumard, Dan Sperber, and Jean-Baptiste André (among several others). They make heavy 
use of BMT in an attempt to explain the origins of fairness concerns in the course of hominin 
evolution. I will argue that this account runs into severe problems related to its application 
of BMT as well as regarding the explanatory power that is attributed to it. On the one hand, 
this will give reason for skepticism about the plausibility of Baumard et al.’s overarching 
claim that biological market effects have been a key driver of hominin social evolution. On 
the other hand, these pitfalls point to the explanatory potential of BMT in other, more 
restricted contexts. More specifically, I will suggest that BMT can fill a lacuna in another big 
picture account of hominin evolution. Building on recent work by Michael Tomasello and 
Kim Sterelny, I will outline a scenario in which biological market effects help explain the 
stabilization of norm-based cooperation at a particular stage in hominin evolution. 
Before we take a closer look at the principles of biological markets, it will be helpful to 
sketch the contours of the account of Baumard and his colleagues, the analysis of which will 
comprise the bulk of the paper. Their account is complex and multifaceted: it draws on 
insights from mathematical modeling, anthropology, behavioral ecology, economics, and 
cognitive science. From this combination of inputs, Baumard et al. construct a scenario of 
                                                 
1 Ben Fraser’s ([2013]) discussion of false advertising in biological markets is an exception, but even 
he is not concerned with biological market theory as such. His focus is on partner choice: a necessary 
but insufficient condition for a biological market, as we will see in Section 2. 
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the evolution a shared, intuitive sense of fairness under selective pressures for participating 
in cooperative endeavors with mutual fitness benefits.2⁠ These interactions were market-
based: supply-and-demand effects determined how the spoils from cooperation were divided. 
The hominin lineage started out from a baseline of market-based interactions that we still see 
reflected in our closest primate cousins. These simple biological markets fueled cognitive 
investments in reputational concern. When market-based trade began to expand in size, 
scope, and diversity in the course of hominin evolution, this put an increasing strain on a 
purely strategic, reputation-based management of cooperation. At this point biological 
markets began to select for a genuine sense of fairness about dividing the spoils from 
cooperation.  
Baumard et al. have presented and defended the different components of their overall 
picture in over a dozen articles. Each of these caters to a particular (disciplinary) audience 
while drawing connections to the broader aims of the project. For purposes of discussion in 
this article, we can distinguish between three theses that Baumard et al. develop: 
The market-model thesis: Formal evolutionary models show how biological 
market dynamics can favor the evolution of (preferences for) equitable divisions. 
Given a context of variable supply and demand among individuals from two 
trading classes, with individuals from at least one class being able to choose 
which individuals from the other class to partner with for a cooperative endeavor, 
the division of the spoils from cooperation will evolve to be proportional to each 
individual’s investments. The division at evolutionary equilibrium corresponds 
to our intuitions about fairness (André and Baumard [2011a], [2011b]; Debove, 
André, and Baumard [2015]; Debove, Baumard, and André [2015], [2016], 
[2017]). 
The evolutionary continuity thesis: The common ancestor of humans and great 
apes (and possibly an earlier ancestor shared with other simians) already 
participated in biological market-based exchange. In the course of hominin 
evolution, market-based interactions became an increasingly central feature of 
hominin lifeways. The scale, scope, and diversity of market-based interactions 
                                                 
2 Because of the mutualistic nature of the interactions, the authors sometimes refer to the theory as a 
‘mutualist approach to morality’ (for example, Baumard et al. [2013]). 
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expanded (Baumard [2010a], [2010b], [2016], Baumard et al. [2013]). 
The reputation-escalation thesis: The gradual elaboration of market-based 
interactions instigated an arms race of capacities for reputation monitoring and 
reputation building in hominins, to the point where investing in reputational 
concern became prohibitively expensive. Instrumental preferences for looking 
fair only when being watched by others gave way to non-instrumental 
preferences for being fair. Hence, the human sense of fairness evolved under 
selective pressure from the demands of increasingly competitive biological 
markets (Baumard et al. [2013]; Baumard and Sperber [2012]; Baumard et al. 
[2010]; Sheskin and Baumard [2015]; Sperber and Baumard [2012]). 
Together, these three theses appear to form a tightly interconnected account of the market-
driven evolution of human fairness. The market-model thesis provides a theoretical basis for 
the genealogical narrative about hominin evolution that is presented as the evolutionary 
continuity thesis, which in turn supports the moral-cognitive transition that is argued for 
through the reputation-escalation thesis.  
However, on closer inspection the three theses turn out to suffer from serious problems, 
both individually and in combination with each other. The pivotal issues derive from 
Baumard et al.’s interpretation and application of BMT. I start by showing that the models 
they construct do not meet the basic conditions for being models of biological markets and 
therefore fail to provide the right kind of theoretical foundation for the other theses to build 
on. Next, I show that evolutionary continuity thesis runs into its own, empirical issues: the 
extraordinary cognitive demands it places on our ancestors are demands they could not have 
met. This in turn removes essential support from the reputation-escalation thesis, which faces 
additional conceptual problems of its own. On one interpretation, the reputation-escalation 
thesis provides an explanation for the emergence of a hard-wired ‘market sense’ rather than 
an intuitive fairness sense; on the only other possible reading it explains how a preexisting 
sense of fairness became directly action-guiding and stopped being overruled by strategic 
concerns. Hence, on neither reading does the reputation-escalation thesis account for the 
origins of a genuine fairness sense.  
In sum, I will argue that the account of Baumard and colleagues encounters a combination 
of theoretical, empirical, and conceptual hurdles that render their overall account of the 
market-driven evolution of an intuitive fairness sense deeply problematic. I will provide a 
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detailed assessment of the three theses and their problems in Sections 3 to 5. Having thus 
mapped a range of restrictions and provisos for the successful deployment of BMT, I show 
in Section 6 how it can nevertheless help advance our theorizing about hominin moral 
evolution in a more restricted and targeted way. However, before entering this discussion of 
the (mis)uses of BMT we need an understanding of its elements. So let us first consider the 
basic conditions for biological markets. 
1.1 Conditions for biological markets 
The very idea of a biological market challenges an assumption in economics that traces back 
to Adam Smith, who famously stated that ‘the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for another […] is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals’ 
(Smith [1776], I.I.2). In the early 1990s, Ronald Noë and Peter Hammerstein challenged this 
assumption by suggesting that the basic requirements for market-based exchange could in 
certain conditions be met by non-human animals (Noë and Hammerstein [1994], [1995]; 
Noë, Schaik and Hooff [1991]). 
The development of BMT by Noë and Hammerstein was prompted by the problem of 
defection in dyads of non-kin. Robert Trivers famously proposed that cooperative 
interactions between pairs of individuals could evolve through reciprocity: if the expected 
fitness cost of a helping behavior is lower than the expected fitness advantage to the recipient, 
the helping behavior will evolve when it is reliably reciprocated (Trivers [1971]).3⁠ In other 
words, reciprocity requires an (evolutionary) expectation of mutual benefit. But reciprocity 
doesn’t come for free: benefitting from one’s partner’s help without returning the effort is 
even more advantageous.  Trivers’s proposal therefore fueled many well-known modeling 
efforts and theoretical extensions to account for the evolutionary stability of reciprocity 
(Alexander [1987]; Axelrod and Hamilton [1981]; Dugatkin [1997]; Nowak and Sigmund 
[1992]). Virtually all of these followed the example Trivers’s had set in considering strategies 
of cooperation and defection for individuals in fixed and enduring interactions. Noë and 
Hammerstein argued that this focus on obligate partnerships explained why real-world 
examples of reciprocity remained few and far between: in reality, many organisms have 
considerable influence over which others to partner with and when to abandon a partner (Noë 
                                                 
3 Trivers introduced the term ‘reciprocal altruism’ for interactions of this kind, but this terminology 
is considered misleading since no one is paying a net fitness cost (Carter [2014]; Schino [2014]; West 
et al. [2007]). 
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and Hammerstein [1994]; Noë [2006]; Carter [2014]). They thus argued for the relevance of 
partner choice and partner switching (in addition to partner control) in the study of 
cooperation. BMT developed from considering the dynamics of cooperation under this 
broader interpretation of reciprocity. 
Consider the formation of mutually beneficial partnerships between agents of different 
trading classes, with members of one class having the opportunity to choose which members 
of the other class they opt to trade a resource or service with. Since the choosing individuals 
will profit from picking the best available partners, their potential partners will profit from 
competing to be chosen as a trading partner. Discriminative partner choice by one class thus 
evokes an outbidding competition in the other class. Those who can offer the desired 
commodities at the lowest ‘price’ will tend to be selected as partners and obtain benefits from 
trading. For partner choice and outbidding competition to result in market-based exchange, 
a further condition needs to be met. It must be possible for the supply/demand ratio of the 
traded commodities to change. This last condition permits the operation of a biological 
equivalent of the law of supply and demand. For example, if supply increases due to a rise in 
the number of potential trading partners, this will lower the price they can ask from the 
choosing agents (the demand side). 
We can summarize this into four basic conditions that must be met for a biological market 
to materialize (Barrett and Henzi [2006]; Hammerstein and Noë [2016]; Werner et al. [2014], 
Noë and Kiers [2018]): 
• Exchange and trade: Individuals can be sorted into classes with different 
degrees of access and control over certain commodities (resources or services). 
Individuals from one trading class can exchange commodities with individuals 
from at least one other trading class. 
• Discriminative partner choice: Individuals can compare offers and choose (or 
switch) between available trading partners in search of a better offer. 
• Outbidding competition: There are differences in the profits individuals can 
reap from trading at a given rate of exchange of commodities (the ‘price’). 
• Supply/demand variation: It is possible for the supply/demand ratio to change 
and affect the price. For example, if it becomes cheaper to supply a certain 
commodity and demand is stable, the price will tend to drop. 
When these four conditions are in place, an ecological equivalent of the supply and demand 
will determine the exchange value of the traded commodities, akin to bartering and face-to-
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face trading in human economic markets (Noë and Hammerstein [1995]; Noë [2016]). All 
else being equal, the forces of supply and demand push the price toward the point at which 
the level of supply and demand balance. The biological market is said to ‘clear’ at this market 
equilibrium, as in classical economic market theory. 
There are important differences between the markets of biology and classical economics. 
Three key departures from classical economic markets are worth highlighting: biological 
markets do not require rational and cognitively advanced utility-maximizing agents, but can 
work with cognitively simple fitness-maximizing individuals; they do not incorporate 
explicit price mechanisms, but price setting is approximated by individuals’ consideration of 
the state of the local market in their decision to accept or decline an (implicit) offer; and 
finally, since biological markets are not regulated by binding and enforceable contracts they 
are more vulnerable to cheating, exploitation, and extortion (Bowles and Hammerstein 
[2003]). This last point was Adam Smith’s prime reason for rejecting the idea of non-human 
markets out of hand. Modern economic theory, on the other hand, recognizes that contracts 
are often incomplete and their maintenance costly, and considers that agents tend to have 
limited information about other transactions in the market. Developments of this sort in the 
sphere of economics suggest that the conceptual and theoretical divide between economic 
and biological markets is less wide and deep than it may initially appear to be (Hammerstein 
and Hagen, [2005]; Hammerstein and Noë [2016]; Noë [2016]).  
Over the last two decades, numerous observational studies and field experiments have 
been carried out to identify market effects in nature. I close this section with a few examples 
of biological markets that will prove instructive for purposes of contrast and comparison in 
later sections. Most studies of biological markets have looked at interactions among non-
human primates. A well-known case of a primate biological market comes from a field 
experiment with vervet monkeys. Fruteau et al. ([2009]) showed that a shift in food supply 
led to changes in the ratio of grooming that was exchanged for food, in line with predictions 
from BMT. Their experiment had two phases. In the first phase, they designated a single low-
ranking female as food provider by training her to trigger the release of a large amount of 
food from a container. This ‘provider effect’ significantly increased the ratio of grooming 
given relative to grooming received for this female; her novel food-providing monopoly had 
given her strong leverage over grooming partners. In the second phase, the experimenters 
introduced another, equally rich food container of a different design. Another low-ranking 
female had been trained to open this box. Fruteau et al. found that this shift from a monopoly 
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to a duopoly of food suppliers caused a drop in the grooming ratio for the first provider and 
increased the grooming ratio for the second provider, exactly as BMT predicts. Increased 
supply with stable demand resulted in a lower average food price. 
It seems intuitive to look for market effects in primate species, on the expectation that 
satisfying the conditions for biological markets is limited to cerebrally advanced and 
behaviorally flexible species. However, one of the most prominent examples of a biological 
market comes from fishes rather than primates. The poster child of BMT is the interspecific 
mutualism between the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus and ‘client’ reef fish species. 
Cleaners are territorial and usually occupy fixed territories of a few cubic meters on a coral 
reef. Clients queue at these ‘cleaning stations’ to get their skin cleansed of ectoparasites, 
which form a major component of the cleaners’ diet. Client fish come in two variants: 
‘choosy’ species whose territorial range includes several cleaning stations and ‘resident’ 
species that only have access to one cleaning site. These circumstances set the stage for an 
outbidding competition with market effects (Bshary [2001]). Queueing clients compete over 
access to a given cleaner, whereas the cleaners compete against each other for access to the 
choosy clients. A cleaner that fails to discriminate between choosy and resident clients risks 
losing the choosy individuals to a competing cleaner at a nearby cleaning station. Cleaners 
therefore tend to respond to the presence of choosy species by cleaning them first and by 
providing a higher quality cleaning service than they give to resident clients (Bshary and 
Grutter [2002]). This behavior cannot be accounted for by differences in the food patches 
that individuals constitute: even when residents carry more ectoparasites than choosy 
individuals they fail to gain priority in the cleaning queue. This suggests that the cleaners are 
treating choosy clients as social partners with outside options. Cleaners respond to a changing 
market place: an increase in competition with other cleaners through the appearance of 
choosy clients (i.e. an increase in supply of cleaning opportunities) induces them to lower the 
average price of the cleaning service (Bshary and Schäffer [2002]; Adam [2010]).  
The cleaner-client fish mutualism suggests that cognitive sophistication isn’t of overriding 
importance to get a biological market going. Whether or not market effects can arise will also 
depend on the nature of the traded commodities and the structure of the trading environment, 
to mention just two factors. The cleaner-client fish market is facilitated by the instantaneous 
and simultaneous distribution of the traded commodities: the cleaning service constitutes the 
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provision of food.4 This obligate simultaneity of the transaction eliminates the possibility for 
cheating that exists in delayed, contingent exchange. The structure of the trading environment 
also helps. It is relatively easy for cleaners to monitor the state of the local market, since 
cleaning only happens at fixed cleaning stations; a growing queue of clients waiting to be 
cleaned is an unambiguous sign of increasing demand. Finally, cleaners can often rely on 
easily discernable and robust differences in morphology between choosy and resident clients 
to reliably tell their different kinds of customers apart (Bshary and Schäffer [2002]; Bshary 
and Noë [2003]).  
In Section 4, I will return to this observation that the satisfaction of the conditions for 
market-based exchange isn’t only—or even primarily—a cognitive affair. But first, let us 
consider the application of BMT by Baumard and colleagues in their modeling exercises, 
which they present as the backbone of their hypothesis about the role of biological markets 
in human evolution. 
2 Modeling the cooperation market 
2.1 Cooperation markets and the evolution of equitable divisions 
Baumard and colleagues take up BMT to model what they call ‘cooperation markets’: 
situations in which individuals compete for participations in cooperative ventures, the surplus 
of which needs to be divided in some way. If a pair of individuals with equal bargaining 
power has to repeatedly bargain over how to divide a pool of resources which they have 
harvested cooperatively, they will evolve to agree on dividing the spoils equally (Rubinstein 
[1982]). In the long term, neither party can force the other into accepting less than half. But 
what if there exist strong asymmetries between interacting individuals? Baumard et al. aim 
to show that even if within pairs some individuals have more bargaining power than others, 
market effects can prohibit them from exercising their power. In a biological cooperation 
markets individuals reliably evolve a disposition to share equitably. 
Consider the simplest market model they offer in support of this claim (André and 
Baumard  [2011b]). The model is based on the Dictator Game: a proposer determines the 
division of a bundle or resources between itself and its partner (its responder), who is forced 
                                                 
4 At least this holds for the standard cases of ectoparasite removal. Cleaners can also take bites of 
mucus tissue, which is not a service to the client. For further discussion of opportunities for freeriding 
in contexts of partner choice, see Fraser ([2013]). 
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to accept the proposed division. In a standard (non-iterated, anonymous) Dictator Game the 
most successful proposers will be those that make maximally unfair offers, leaving the 
smallest possible amount of the resources to their responders. André and Baumard explore 
what offer-levels evolve when these games are iterated and modified to allow for partner 
choice.  
 The basic setup is as follows. In each round of the game, responders can team up with 
proposers in exchange for a share of the cooperative benefits. Proposers first announce their 
genetically set offer-levels. Next, responders are asked one-by-one and in random order to 
team up with a proposer until no further pairs can be formed. Responders are utility 
maximizers: they choose to partner with the most generous proposer available. At the end of 
each round, individuals reproduce asexually and in proportion to the amount of benefits they 
have obtained. Offspring inherit their parent’s genetically encoded offer-level with a small 
probability of mutation. 
André and Baumard argue that this setup satisfies the essential conditions for a biological 
market. Proposers and responders form two trading classes, responders compete for access 
to the most generous proposers, and the density of proposers and responders can be 
interpreted as setting the level of supply and demand, respectively. We can also think of 
proposers’ offer-levels as determining the ‘price’ of an interaction. A proposer that is 
disposed to offer less than half of the benefits sets a high price: the return on investment from 
cooperating with this proposer will be low. A proposer that offers more than half sets a low 
price. 
Using this basic setup, André and Baumard ([2011b]) first consider how prices evolve in 
a population in which supply and demand are fixed exogenously. Consider a population in 
which the level of supply is lower than the level of demand: responders outnumber proposers 
by a fixed proportion. In this population, all proposers will find a responder to interact with, 
but some responders will be left out in the cold, unable to reap benefits from teaming up with 
a proposer. Given such a situation of high demand for proposers, a stingy mutant proposer 
has an advantage. By making offers slightly below the average offer-level of resident 
proposers, stingy mutants will obtain a slightly above-average share of the benefits. Over 
time, the invasion of mutants will cause offer-levels to drop to the point where responders 
receive the smallest possible returns from pairing with a proposer. The opposite happens in 
a population in which the level of supply is fixed to be higher than the level of demand: 
proposers outnumber responders. Since in this population proposers will have to compete for 
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responders, mutant proposers that make slightly higher-than-average offers will have an 
advantage. Selection for ever more generous mutants thus causes offer-levels to skyrocket: 
proposers end up making offers as high as they can to attract responders. In sum, when levels 
of supply and demand are fixed exogenously at unequal levels, divisions will evolve to be 
maximally unfair. The price of interacting with a proposer will end up being either maximally 
high (when demand outstrips supply) or extremely low (when supply outstrips demand).  
But what happens to prices if the level of supply and demand can change? That is, what if 
individuals can choose which trading class to play in, based on information about average 
expected payoffs from each class? André and Baumard show that in this case the offer-level 
will affect the density of players in each class in such a way that the expected payoffs for 
individuals in each class will equalize within each generation. That is, for each genetically 
programmed offer-level, the population will move toward a particular ecological equilibrium 
of proposers and responders. Next, André and Baumard show how, in evolutionary time, 
selection on slight mutations will affect the offer-levels proposers make. Selection moves the 
population along a series of ecological equilibria to the market equilibrium at which 
proposers make offers of equal splits with responders. 
Again, this outcome can be grasped intuitively. Consider a population in which proposers 
start out by offering less than half of the benefits from cooperation to their partners. This 
makes it profitable for individuals in the responder role to switch to the proposer side. The 
proportion of proposes increases, which causes the average payoff from playing in the 
proposer role to drop: some proposers won’t be able to find a responder to team up with and 
thus get zero benefits from cooperation. It stops being advantageous to switch between 
trading classes when the average payoffs for proposers and responders balance. This is the 
ecological equilibrium for the offer-level: the point at which the proportion of individuals in 
each trading class is such that no individual has an incentive to switch classes.  
Each average offer-level has its own ecological equilibrium. For offer levels of less than 
half (high prices), it follows that the lower the offer-level, the more proposers will outnumber 
responders at ecological equilibrium: a higher payoff from partnering with a responder 
compensates for a higher risk not finding one (Figure 1a). The opposite holds for average 
offer-levels of more than half. The higher the offers proposers are disposed to make (the 
lower the price they ask), the more individuals will play in the responder role at ecological 
equilibrium. The higher the payoff responders receive from partnering with a proposer, the 
more it pays for them to risk not finding a proposer to partner with (Figure 1b).  
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Before considering how the establishment of ecological equilibria for any given starting 
price-level feeds into the evolutionary dimension of the model, first notice that if we plot the 
ecological equilibria for different price-levels, a familiar pattern from classical economic 
market theory appears. The proportions of proposers at the equilibria for different prices line 
up along an upward sloping supply curve, the proportions of responders follow a downward 
sloping demand curve (Figure 1c). At the intersection of these ‘curves’—straight lines in this 
case—lies the market equilibrium at which the division of the spoils from cooperation is 
equal. André and Baumard show that from any price-level that is taken as starting point, 
natural selection will push the population from its initial ecological equilibrium to the market 
equilibrium of fair prices. 
Take a population in which the proposers start out making high offers (low prices) on 
average: this population balances at an ecological equilibrium of excess demand (Figure 2). 
Since all proposers in this population are guaranteed to find a partner, stingy mutant 
individuals that are disposed to make slightly lower offers when playing in the proposer role 
will have a fitness advantage. However, as the average price of interacting with a proposer 
thus rises, the level of demand will drop, since individuals will increasingly opt to play in the 
proposer role. As a result, the population moves toward a new ecological equilibrium with a 
higher supply-level and lower demand-level. This selection for stingy mutants continues until 
the population reaches as state in which mutants that ask still higher prices are no longer at 
an advantage because they be able to won’t find a partner. This is the ecological equilibrium 
at which the proportion of proposers and responders is equal: the market equilibrium of equal 
division.  
We see the opposite movement towards the market equilibrium in a population that starts 
out at an ecological equilibrium of excess supply (low prices). This population will be 
invaded by generous mutants that make slightly higher offers when playing in the proposer 
role. André and Baumard show that their slightly lower gains from cooperation are offset by 
their increased chances of finding a partner compared to other proposers. As a result, this 
population will evolve along ecological equilibria of increasingly lower supply and higher 
demand, again until it reaches the market equilibrium at which the proportion of proposers 
and responders are equal (Figure 3). In sum: if demand outstrips supply, selection favoring 
stingy proposers moves the price up to the level of equal splits; if supply outstrips demand, 
selection favoring more generous proposers drives the price down to the level of equal splits. 
Hence, regardless of which ecological equilibrium the population starts out at, selection will 
Biological markets, cooperation, and the evolution of morality 
 13 
drive the population toward the market equilibrium. André and Baumard thus conclude that 
their models have shown how ‘fairness [can] evolve from any initial state, and is evolutionary 
stable’ (p. 1451). Selection on random mutations to the offer-level operates as ‘an equivalent 
of the law of supply and demand’ (p. 1447). 
2.2 Markets without market dynamics? 
The model I have just described verbally relies on assumptions and idealizations that 
obviously limit its informativeness and scope of application. Baumard and colleagues are the 
first to admit this. For instance, they note that the idea of cost-free and unconstrained role 
switching hardly applies to human interaction (André and Baumard ([2011b], p. 1454). Over 
the years, they have elaborated the initial model in an effort to relax several such limiting 
assumptions. For example, Debove et al. ([2015]) have shown that one need not make the 
‘highly debatable’ assumption that all individuals have equal possibilities of choosing roles 
and partners. Even if there exist ‘systematic asymmetries of strength’ between individuals, 
equal divisions can evolve in a broad range of circumstances (p. 562). Another newer model 
shows that if individuals make unequal investments, selection favors proportional, equitable 
divisions rather than just equal ones (Debove et al. [2017]). These elaborations still leave us 
with many aspects of the models that could be questioned for their ecological validity (such 
as the assumption that choosing and/or switching partners is cheap: a key assumption that is 
needed to guarantee equitable outcomes). However, I want to raise a different issue. I want 
to consider not how instructive and robust the market models are, but whether they actually 
are what they are claimed to be: market models. 
Baumard and colleagues are clear on this point: their models model markets in the sense 
of biological market theory. Not only do they state this explicitly, but we have also seen that 
the couch their explanations of the models in terms of ‘prices’, ‘supply’, ‘demand’, and 
‘market equilibrium’. This terminology notwithstanding, it is unclear how their models are 
supposed to demonstrate genuine market effects in the evolution of equitable outcomes. For 
a crucial feature is missing from the models that I have just described: an account of what 
happens when supply or demand as such shift, i.e. when the ratio of supply and demand 
changes. On closer inspection, it becomes clear why this is missing: the models are 
constructed such that shifts in supply or demand cannot possibly occur. 
To see this, let us return to the model from André and Baumard ([2011b]). We have seen 
that in this model a change in prices (through a genetic mutation) will affect the level of 
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supply and demand. For instance, in a population with stingy proposers, which balances at 
an ecological equilibrium of an excess supply of cooperative opportunities, selection will 
favor mutations for generosity, which reduces the level of supply and moves the population 
toward a supply-demand balance. However, it is an elementary principle in economics that 
in order to meaningfully speak of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’, it must also be possible for these 
to change as such: the supply and demand curves must be able shift, and to do so 
independently (Frank et al. [2018]). We have seen examples of such supply and demand 
shifts in Section 2. When the supply of fish providing cleaning jobs or monkeys providing 
food increases, the average price of the commodity they offer drops. Yet, shifts of this kind 
cannot occur in the models of André and Baumard, since they define ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ 
in terms of each other, as the proportions of individuals in each role at ecological equilibrium. 
This entails that the only possible levels of supply and demand are those that fall on the lines 
that connect the ecological equilibria, as in Figure 1c. A shift in supply or demand would 
entail, absurdly, that certain market players have an undefined role qua market players (and 
the cumulative frequency of proposers and responders doesn’t sum to unity) or that there are 
more market players than there are players (and the cumulative frequency of proposers and 
responders exceeds unity).  
Since André and Baumard fail to define supply and demand coherently, it is misleading 
to speak of natural selection acting as a ‘market force’ that can move the price toward a 
‘market equilibrium price’ of equal division. To meaningfully speak of market forces and 
equilibrium prices, it must be possible for market dynamics to be responsive to shifts in 
supply or demand, and for the equilibrium price to be affected by such shifts. In contrast, the 
fixity of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ in the models of André and Baumard guarantees that there is 
only one equilibrium price: an offer of exactly half of the resources. Put differently, the 
evolution of preferences for equity is not due to market effects, but due to their absence! 
This problem is even more conspicuous in the later models of Baumard and colleagues 
(André and Baumard [2011a]; Debove, André and Baumard [2015]; Debove, Baumard and 
André [2015], [2016], [2017]). In these newer models—variants of Ultimatum Games rather 
than Dictator Games—individuals are paired up randomly before within each dyad each 
individual is assigned to a role. The individuals playing as proposers make their (genetically-
encoded) offers. If the offer-level is on or above the responders’ acceptance threshold, the 
offer is accepted and implemented. If it falls below the threshold, the responder will decline 
the offer and both individuals incur a small cost to find a new partner. Individuals reproduce 
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in accordance with the number of successful social interactions they have had in their 
lifetime. Like the model from André and Baumard ([2011b]), these newer models show that 
if the cost of switching partners is kept low, there will be selection for an expected payoff of 
(close to) half the resources.5 Similarly, Baumard et al. present these models as market 
models, since ‘supply and demand represented by the trading classes will determine the value 
of the exchanged commodity’ (Debove et al. [2015]). However, these models still define 
supply and demand in terms of each other, as proportions of the total population. Moreover, 
by sorting all individuals into pairs before offers are made they stipulate even more 
conspicuously that supply and demand are always exactly balanced. Hence, puzzlingly, the 
‘market’ has only a single price equilibrium. Again, this can only mean that we are not 
dealing with a market in the first place. Baumard et al.’s market models are not the genuine 
article.  
At this point, one might be tempted to respond that Baumard et al. could just retract the 
‘market’ label (or suggested they were using it in a loose and metaphorical sense) and argue 
that their models nevertheless show how a combination of partner choice and role choice can 
lead to equitable outcomes. Yet, when we situate the models in the context of the broader 
framework that Baumard et al. aim to develop, a response along these lines becomes rather 
problematic. First, it would mean that the models become irrelevant to the overall project 
they are pursuing. It would be to give up on the claim that the models support the overarching 
project of showing that equitable outcomes will evolve under genuine market dynamics, of 
the sort described by biological market theory. Second, it would arguably provide a weak 
foundation for an alternative big picture account of the evolution of fairness concerns. For, 
note that by making it a precondition that supply and demand are always exactly balanced, 
the models do not just incorporate a questionable empirical assumption, but also effectively 
assume perfect (global) equality of opportunity to explain equality of outcome in cooperative 
ventures.6 This erodes the relevance of the models for any big picture account of hominin 
                                                 
5 It is harder to give an intuitive rendering of why equal (or, in case of unequal investments: equitable) 
divisions evolve under these conditions. Fairly complex dynamics arise from the simultaneous 
evolution of offer and response parameters. The model of André and Baumard ([2011b]) was easier 
to grasp on an intuitive level, since it only involved the evolution of the offer parameter. 
6 André and Baumard ([2011a]) are explicit about this: ‘The emergence of fairness thus crucially 
relies on the fact that all individuals have a fair chance of playing both roles in each interaction’ (p. 
132). Although in later models they show that fairness can also evolve if some individuals have a 
higher chance of being assigned to the proposer role, this result still depends on the assumption that 
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evolution, which surely requires explaining—rather than assuming—these aspects of 
cooperation. 
3 Markets and evolutionary continuity 
In the previous section, I argued that since the market-model thesis is not supported by 
Baumard et al.’s models, this removes one pillar of support from their big picture account of 
the biological market-driven evolution of fairness. In this section, I will argue that the 
continuity thesis also runs into problems with regard to its use of BMT. But before doing so, 
I want to briefly consider the interface between these two theses. Baumard et al. tell us 
surprisingly little about how the market-model thesis as such (regardless of its evidential 
status) is supposed to provide a theoretical backdrop for the evolutionary continuity thesis. 
However, what they do say gives us reason to think that the connection between the theses is 
problematic. 
The market-model thesis, they tells us, is aimed at modeling ‘ultimate biological markets 
[in which] the ‘bargaining’ already took place at the ultimate level by means of natural 
selection . . . the result of this bargaining is the existence of a genuine sense of fairness which 
‘automatically’ makes humans prefer equitable strategies’ (Debove et al. [2017], p. 11). 
Baumard et al. explicitly contrast these ultimate biological markets in which selection favors 
automatic, inflexible dispositions with proximate biological markets in which individuals 
flexibly adjust the price they pay to changes in supply and demand (as in the examples from 
Section 2). Yet, in drawing this contrast they overlook that it exposes a glaring disconnect 
between the two theses, since the evolutionary continuity thesis is clearly a thesis about the 
expansion of proximate biological markets. If the evolutionary continuity thesis is to be 
believed, it was exactly the increasing importance and centrality of bargaining between 
individuals within their lifetimes that set hominins on a different evolutionary track. This 
disconnect between the market-model and evolutionary continuity theses suggests that the 
account of Baumard et al. is much less tightly integrated than they make it seem. The results 
that the market-model thesis was supposed to provide cannot be the kind of results that 
support the evolutionary continuity thesis. This gives us further reasons to put market-model 
thesis aside and consider whether Baumard et al. can marshal sufficient evidence for the 
                                                 
the class of responders and proposers will be equally large. That assumption alone is sufficient to 
grant global equality of opportunity to cooperating individuals. 
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market-driven history of hominin evolution on the basis of the evolutionary continuity thesis 
alone. 
Of the three theses I distinguished, the evolutionary continuity thesis has been developed 
the least by Baumard et al. Although their writings are full of scattered references to the 
purported gradual expansion of hominin biological markets—in terms of the diversity of 
traded commodities, the number of trading opportunities, and dependency of individuals on 
trade—they do not provide evidence for this in the form of a systematic genealogical account. 
We learn little more than that market-based trade in non-human primates is ‘no doubt the 
closest thing to morality that has been observed in non-human animals’ (Baumard [2016], p. 
196) and that there exists ‘a genuine continuity between non-human animals and humans in 
this domain […] [A]nimal cooperation and human cooperation may have followed the same 
evolutionary pathway, differing only at the proximal level (scale of cooperation, 
psychological mechanisms)’ (Baumard [2010b], p. 5).  
There are good reasons to be skeptical even of this thin account of evolutionary continuity. 
The evidence for the baseline is weak, as is the support for the hypothesis that there was 
gradual increase in complexity of biological market. Baumard ([2010a], [2016]) cite several 
studies in support of their claim that there is solid evidence for a baseline of already quite 
sophisticated primate biological markets (PBMs) in which individuals trade two or more 
commodities. They note that several studies have shown that monkeys and apes trade 
commodities such as grooming, sex, meat, agonistic support, and access to infants. However, 
apart from artificial field experiments like those of Fruteau et al. ([2009]) that we saw in 
Section 2, the evidence for genuine market effects remains scarce. Methodological concerns 
about measuring exchange (which I won’t review here) have been a subject of ongoing 
discussion (Dunayer and Berman [2016]; Kaburu and Newton-Fisher [2016]; Sánchez-
Amaro and Amici [2015], [2016]). But apart from methodological concerns, there are 
pressing theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt that monkeys or apes can engage in the 
market-based trade of even this limited range of commodity. In their excellent review of 
PBM studies, Sanchéz-Amaro and Amici note that if, say, grooming can be traded for two or 
more other commodities, it quickly becomes very difficult to establish how its value changes 
under fluctuations in supply and demand: ‘If grooming can be traded for different 
commodities (e.g. grooming, food, tolerance at feeding or drinking sites, access to infants, 
preferential mating, agonistic support), which percentage of grooming given should we 
correlate with the amount of each commodity received, when testing BMT?’ (Sánchez-
Joeri Witteveen 
 18 
Amaro and Amici [2015], p. 54). The problem is aggravated by differences in the time-frames 
at which different pairs of commodities are traded, and by the trading of the other 
commodities against each other. For example, although isolated studies have described 
chimpanzees as trading agonistic support and food for grooming, food for sex, and sex for 
grooming, the combination of these results amounts to a very implausible picture of what 
chimps are capable of. It would be astounding if they could reliably track and respond to the 
complex, interacting changes in supply and demand that will be manifested in the 
overlapping exchanges. It would be a stretch to think that even humans could pull this off in 
the absence of elaborate forms of bookkeeping, price mechanisms, and monetary currencies.7 
Perhaps certain non-human primates engage in market-based exchange in isolated and 
controlled contexts, as with the vervet monkeys from the study of Fruteau et al. ([2009]). But 
these markets don’t scale. Just adding a single additional tradeable resource to a local dyadic 
market requires individuals to track and update three prices instead of one, while the 
increased spatio-temporal scale of transactions exacerbates the problem of tracking what has 
been paid by and to others. More generally speaking, market mechanisms quickly become 
strained when different resources are exchanged at different time scales, in different 
combinations, and in different, changing locations. These problems of scaling render the 
continuity thesis very implausible. In order for simple biological markets to have expanded 
in size, scope, and diversity to the extent that Baumard et al. imagine they did, robust pricing 
and policing mechanisms need to have been in place. Biological market dynamics on their 
own won’t create these. 
4 Markets, reputation-escalation, and fairness 
The issues with the evolutionary continuity thesis have direct implications for the plausibility 
of the reputation-escalation thesis. The nature of the interface between these two theses is 
clear and straightforward. On the overall picture that Baumard et al. argue for, the dynamic 
of expanding and intensifying hominin markets is what drives the escalation of reputational 
                                                 
7 Some have argued that chimps and other primates rely on capacities of ‘emotional book keeping’ to 
estimate partner-value in a way that fuels outbidding competition and is responsive to changes in 
supply and demand (De Waal [2000]; Schino and Aureli [2009], [2010]). But as Sánchez-Amaro and 
Amici ([2015]) have pointed out, it is unclear how this mechanism is supposed to be responsive to 
changes in supply or demand. Does it respond to changes in the number of partners to competitors, 
or in the ratio? And how does it account for partners in the exchange of one commodity that are 
competitors for another?  
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concern. The reputation-escalation thesis thus offers a (moral-)psychological complement to 
the socio-ecological backdrop of the evolutionary continuity thesis. If I am right that this 
backdrop is problematic, the reputation-escalation thesis comes under pressure too: it is no 
longer clear what drove the escalation of reputation such that it culminated in selection for a 
fairness sense.8  
Let us set this problem aside for the moment and consider the reputation-escalation thesis 
in its own right. First, consider the thesis in more detail. As I mentioned in the introduction, 
the question Baumard and colleagues seek to answer with the reputation-escalation thesis, is 
how hominins went from having a strategic preference for respecting other people’s interests 
to having a genuine moral concern to respect those interests (Baumard et al. [2013]; Sperber 
and Baumard [2012]). The answer, they suggest, centrally involves an arms race between 
capacities for reputation monitoring and reputation building. In the earliest hominin 
biological markets, individuals that monitored the behavior of others in search for clues about 
their dispositions for generosity were at an advantage: ‘In choosing a partner, one looks for 
relevant competencies and resources (which differ from one type of venture to another) and 
for cooperativeness or fairness, that is, for a reliable disposition to share the costs and to 
refrain from taking more than one’s share of the benefits of cooperation’ (Sperber and 
Baumard [2012] p. 507). The evolution of these ‘evaluative functions of morality’ in turn 
created selective pressures for individuals to behave so as to be chosen as partners in 
cooperative ventures.  
Sperber and Baumard argue that initially, reputation monitoring came down to tracking 
the past behavior of others in search for clues about future cooperativeness. But as hominin 
markets became more expansive and complex, assessments of past performance became both 
less available and less reliable predictors of future cooperativeness: ‘cooperativeness [could 
no longer] be effectively assessed without making inferences about others’ mental states and 
dispositions’ (p. 507). The evolution of mindreading enabled hominins to better predict 
                                                 
8 Notice the difference here with the interface between the market-model thesis and the evolutionary 
continuity thesis that I reviewed at the start of the previous section. We saw that those two theses 
mismatched on a conceptual/theoretical level. This is not the case with the connection between the 
evolutionary continuity thesis and the reputation-escalation thesis; the nature of the evidential relation 
between the two is clear. But precisely because of this, the problems with the former thesis do directly 
impact the plausibility of the latter. 
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actions on the basis of inferred beliefs and desires. But mindreading also turned hominins 
into better strategizers. Individuals became more adept at shaping others’ beliefs about their 
own dispositions, to their own advantage. The result was a hominin world of Machiavellian 
strategizers who behaved like Hume’s sensible knave: sharing fairly when their reputation 
was at stake but maximizing their own advantage otherwise. But strategizing had its limits: 
‘from a cognitive point of view, a Machiavellian strategy is a demanding one. It is often 
difficult to tell whether others are paying attention to our behaviour, and to predict how they 
might interpret it and what they would think or say about us as a result. Even if a 
Machiavellian agent cleverly manages to avoid being caught cheating, she might still behave 
in a way that suggests she is being clever rather than moral, and compromise her reputation 
as a result’ (Sperber and Baumard [2012], p. 499). Thus, Sperber and Baumard argue, at 
some point the Machiavellian strategy became too demanding and too risky. When word 
about one’s cheating behavior could spread quickly, even a small glitch—behaving selfishly 
when someone happened to be watching—could turn one into a pariah and ruin one’s chances 
of future cooperation. But when the Machiavellian strategy became ineffective, how else 
could individuals secure a reputation as a good cooperator? ‘Is there a way cognitively easier 
and safer than a Machiavellian strategy to secure such a reputation? Yes: it consists in 
deserving it, that is, in having a genuine, non-instrumental preference for moral behavior and 
a disposition to act on the basis of that preference. At the cost of missing a few opportunities 
for profitable cheating, a genuinely moral person is in a uniquely good position to be regarded 
as such’ (Sperber and Baumard [2012], p. 499). In short, when it became too costly to rely 
on an instrumental preference for looking fair, it became advantageous to have a non-
instrumental preference for being fair. At some point in the hominin lineage, our ancestors 
evolved a genuine fairness sense. 
4.1 The target of reputational concern 
Regardless of the empirical worries that could be raised about this transition from strategizing 
to moralizing, I will argue that it founders on a conceptual problem pertaining to the assumed 
target of reputational and moral concern. We have just seen that Sperber and Baumard present 
the goal of strategic reputation monitoring as that of determining whether others have ‘a 
reliable disposition to share the costs and to refrain from taking more than one’s share of the 
benefits of cooperation’ (Sperber and Baumard [2012], p. 507). But what is the capacity for 
recognizing ‘one’s share’ that features in this account of strategizing? The wording suggests 
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that even before a genuine fairness sense evolved, the division of cooperative costs was 
already governed by some kind of shared (proto-)normative capacity. But given that this 
capacity cannot have been a full-blown fairness sense, what kind of behavioral tendencies 
did it implement?  
To answer this question, we should zoom out to the big picture that Baumard et al. argue 
for. Given their hypothesis that the evolution of reputation management was driven by 
cooperation in a biological market, the evolution of a capacity to contribute and receive 
‘one’s share’ must have consisted in the capacity to monitor and respond to market 
equilibrium prices. In other words, when Sperber and Baumard state that Machiavellian 
strategizers aimed ‘to merely appear to behave morally’ (p. 496), they must be speaking of 
individuals that asked and paid market prices whenever their reputation was at stake, but who 
tried to get away with paying less (or keeping more) whenever they could.  
However, notice what this means for the transition from having an instrumental preference 
for looking fair to acquiring a genuinely moral disposition for being fair in the context of 
biological markets becoming increasingly central to cooperation. If taking and giving one’s 
share is (implicitly) defined in terms of asking and paying market prices, then the move from 
strategic behavior to moral behavior must amount to a move from only respecting market 
prices when one’s reputation is at stake to always following market prices, without 
attempting to escape them strategically. In other words, if we follow the reputation-escalation 
thesis to its logical conclusion, it points to the evolution of an always-on ‘market sense’ rather 
than a substantive fairness sense.  
This conclusion is hard to square with our actual intuitions about fairness, which are not 
straightforwardly governed by dynamics of supply and demand (Birch and Witteveen, 2017; 
DeScolio, 2013). Moreover, it would be a stretch to think of departures from conformity to 
market prices as distortions or aberrations in the operation of our intuitive sense of fairness. 
Interestingly, Baumard ([2016]) himself has argued that a market sense does not equal a 
fairness sense, in his discussion of a classical study by Kahneman et al. ([1986]). Kahneman 
asked his participants whether it would be unfair for a hardware store to raise prices during 
a snowstorm. The majority thought this would indeed be grossly unfair. Baumard agrees, and 
presents this as an illustration of our unreflective, default intuitions about fairness: ‘[The 
store owner] is just taking advantage of a favorable balance of forces, and thus has no right 
to a larger piece of the common pie’ (p. 78). This seems at odds with his own theory. If 
fairness comes down to following the state of the market, we should consider the price 
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increase fair. Alternatively, if acting like a true Homo economicus does not correspond to 
acting fair on an intuitive level (which it seems hard to doubt indeed!), the reputation-
escalation thesis must be rejected. 
There is no easy way out of this predicament for Baumard and his colleagues. Even if they 
were to drop the market-theoretic framework and propose another evolutionary driver of the 
escalation process, it is not clear how the reputation-escalation thesis could be redeemed as 
an account of the origins of fairness. The deep-seated problem remains that is a thesis about 
the disappearance of strategizing, rather than about the origins of intuitive fairness concerns. 
It is a thesis about how fairness intuitions stopped being overruled by strategic concerns and 
became directly motivating and action-guiding. It thus falls short as an explanation of the 
origins of fairness intuitions. Such an explanation would have to address how hominins went 
from being impulsive-driven ‘wantons’ (akin to other great apes) to becoming animals with 
moral cognition (cf. Kitcher [2006]). 
5 An alternative scenario 
The previous sections have shown that Baumard et al.’s account of the evolution of intuitive 
fairness concerns is deeply problematic. I have argued that the three theses that underpin their 
account run into severe problems, both individually and in combination with each other. My 
appraisal of the market-model and evolutionary continuity theses showed that the market-
based backdrop of the account lacks theoretical and empirical support. My assessment of the 
reputation-escalation thesis revealed a further conceptual problem. This thesis can at best 
explain the evolution of an always-on ‘market sense’; it cannot account for the origins of an 
intuitive fairness sense. 
Although this assessment presents a bleak prospect for a wholly biological market-driven 
account of the evolution of fairness, I will argue that the appreciation we have gained of the 
scope and limits of BMT does point to a more restricted role for BMT in theorizing about 
hominin evolution. In the remainder of this article, I will argue that BMT can help address a 
lacuna in an alternative kind of big picture account of the evolution of fairness. On this 
alternative account, biological markets are not presented as having driven the origin of 
fairness concerns, but rather as stabilizers of basic fairness concerns when these threatened 
to collapse in new and challenging hominin social environments. 
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5.1 Fairness before markets 
An influential alternative picture of the evolution of fairness concerns has been offered by 
Michael Tomasello, who argues that collaboration rather than (market-based) exchange has 
been the key to the evolution of cooperation based on fairness norms (Tomasello [2014], 
[2016]). He suggests that changing ecological circumstances created tight interdependencies 
between early hominins, who became pressured to obtain a larger share of their food through 
active collaboration. At first, this perhaps took the form of group defense and scavenging 
hunts: loosely structured, cognitively undemanding performances in which it would have 
been beneficial to act together. These provided a platform on which more collaborative 
endeavors could be scaffolded. Perhaps around the time of Homo heidelbergensis some 
400kya, active hunting of large game had become an obligate component of the hominin 
social repertoire. Hunting demands close coordination. It drove selection for a capacity to put 
oneself into the shoes of one’s partner, and to acquire a shared understanding of the roles that 
would be required for joint success. On a cognitive level, this translates into a capacity to 
form joints intentions with a partner. Individuals were thus enabled to recognize their partners 
as partners, rather than as social tools for individual success. Tomasello argues that it is only 
a small step from seeing someone as one’s partner to seeing that partner as equivalent and 
equally deserving of a share the spoils. 
Two aspects of this account are worth singling out. First, Tomasello argues that his 
account of cooperation is robust in evolutionary terms, since individuals cannot freeride in 
cases of dyadic collaboration based on joint intentions. If either individual in a dyad fails to 
cooperate, the collaboration breaks down and there will be no benefits to divide. Success 
requires mutual effort. Second, Tomasello suggests that solving the problem of agreeing on 
what constitutes a fair division is easy. In early cases of collaborative foraging, with little to 
no specialized tasks requiring special skills, each role counted for the same. The evolved 
sense of self-other equivalence would have impelled individuals to divide resources evenly. 
Though I think that Tomasello’s account of collaborative mutualism points in the right 
direction, he underestimates the problems of freeriding and division of the benefits. As 
Herbert Gintis ([2015]) and Kim Sterelny ([in preparation]) have pointed out independently, 
Tomasello’s solution to the freerider problem lacks ecological validity. For collaborative 
scavenging and hunting of large game to have paid off, it must have relied on mobs rather 
than dyads. Only after the invention of specialized tools like spears and poisoned arrows 
could hunters perhaps have trimmed down group size to agile pairs in which there was no 
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room for freeriding. But these are late-Pleistocene circumstances, perhaps from after the 
projective revolution from around 70kya (Sterelny [in preparation]). In the earlier Pleistocene 
environments that Tomasello is interested in, shirking or slacking was a live option. In groups 
of a dozen individuals on a hunt it would have paid off not to be in the front-line when 
approaching large game. The erosion of cooperation was a genuine risk. 
Since the problem of freeriding cannot be ignored, the problem of dividing the cake must 
have been more challenging than Tomasello thinks. Nonetheless, his critics are in broad 
agreement that mutualistic collaboration in the context of collaborative defense, scavenging 
and hunting (and perhaps child-rearing) must have been key to the evolution of fairness 
concerns. Sterelny has suggested that instead of being supported by high-level social 
cognition, early forms of norm-based collaboration were supported by a suite of affective 
and retributive emotions (Sterelny, [2012], [in preparation]).9 These would not have provided 
the shortcut to the fully-fledged norms of deservingness that Tomasello is concerned with, 
but they could have furnished hominins with less rigid and explicit (proto-)fairness concerns. 
These would have sufficed at the time, for there is an obvious default answer to the question 
what counts as a fair division in small groups with little to no division of labor: divide the 
cake in equal pieces. 
5.2 Markets and the reciprocation crisis 
If the task of dividing resources fairly was manageable in early hominin environments of 
cooperation, it certainly became strained later on. Tomasello sees the challenge of late-
Pleistocene cooperation essentially as one of an expanding demographic scale. As groups 
grew in size, opportunities for collaboration scaled up in a manner that ‘was relatively 
straightforward: everything went from dyadic and local to universal’ (Tomasello [2016], p. 
86). The cognitive capacities for managing and maintaining cooperative relationships with 
single partners became adapted to dealing with relative strangers: the psychology of dyadic, 
joint intentionality evolved into one of ‘group-minded’, collective intentionality: ‘There was 
[…] a transition from seeing an equivalence between oneself and one’s collaborative partner, 
as did early humans, to seeing an equivalence among all who would be a member of the 
cultural group, that is to say, all rational beings’ (p. 93). 
Given the implausibility of the hypothesized baseline of joint intentionality, we already 
                                                 
9 Perhaps the capacity for moralized norm-guidance also drew on a pre-existing ability to recognize 
and follow non-social norms that was rooted in skilled action (Birch [in preparation]).  
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have good reasons to be skeptical about this solution to the challenge of late-Pleistocene 
cooperation. But, more importantly, we should question whether Tomasello’s diagnosis of 
the challenge as one of an increasing demographic scale is correct. Again, Sterelny ([2014], 
[in preparation]) has argued convincingly that Tomasello underestimates the problem of late-
Pleistocene cooperation. He points out that increase in group size must have been 
accompanied by diversification of the resource- and skill-set, as well as by shifts in the 
spatiotemporal scale of cooperation. Together, these changes constituted an important shift 
in the economic basis of cooperation. Food was no longer predominantly hunted by 
individuals that divided spoils on the spot and that could recognize each other as equally 
deserving based on their equal contributions. Increasingly, supplies became harvested by 
smaller parties, with different skill-sets and different degrees of success, who exchanged a 
variety of items in different quantities and at different rates. Cooperation based on 
collaboration with immediate returns gradually gave way to cooperation based on exchange 
with delayed returns. This transition introduced new risks of escalating conflict. Late-
Pleistocene hominins faced something of a ‘reciprocation crisis’ (Sterelny, [2014], 
[forthcoming, ch. 2], [in preparation]); they lacked the information needed to put themselves 
into their partners’ shoes. The expanding resource base introduced issues of weighing effort, 
skill, and scarcity. What is a fair exchange of one’s skillfully hunted, hard-to-catch, 
perishable gazelle for the heavy stones that a few others have carried (with little skill but 
much effort) from a well-known site? Such problems of incommensurability were 
compounded by problems related to the expanding time horizons of cooperation. Delayed 
and uncertain returns on investment introduced problems of agreeing on appropriate temporal 
discount rates for different transactions (Sterelny [2014], [in preparation]).  
Sterelny’s diagnosis of a late-Pleistocene reciprocation crisis is convincing. But I will 
argue that the solution he sketches does not fully address the problem. Sterelny hypothesizes 
that reciprocation-based cooperation was sustained and stabilized by ‘shared, coordinated 
activity, as in ritual, ceremony, song, and dance’ of which traces appear in the archeological 
record from around 120kya (Sterelny [2014], p. 74). The idea is that ritual activity would 
have smoothed over tensions about exchange by reinforcing longer-term social bonds. 
Affiliative bonding facilitated exchange without being about exchange, but rather by being 
about the persons that did the exchanging. Frictions that arose in the day-to-day activity of 
exchange were dampened and deescalated by restoring social relationships in the quiet hours. 
Sterelny suggests that ritualized peacemaking activities of this sort could have provided a 
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platform for agreeing on default norms of division: ‘being in the same initiation cohort (for 
example) might link individuals firmly enough to maintain cooperative defaults . . . default 
expectations about (say) what kinds of product should be shared, and how the shares should 
be divided’ (Sterelny [2014], p. 74).  
Sterelny mentions Lamalera whale hunting in Indonesia as an illustration. The Lamalera 
have an elaborate system of distribution norms that specify which part of a sperm whale is to 
go to which party. The system includes norms about parties that were involved in very 
indirect ways, such as the sail maker and the craftsmen (Alvard and Nolin [2002]). But whale 
hunting with elaborate task division is not an exemplar of the main challenges posed by 
reciprocation-based cooperation. Although whaling involves considerable delays (and 
frequent failures) in return on investment—and hence does not qualify as an example of 
immediate-return mutualism—Lamalera whale hunting is more akin to mid-Pleistocene 
game hunting than to late-Pleistocene reciprocation and trade. The stable task division and 
the large share of local, group-based activity preserves transparency in monitoring 
contributions made and benefits received. The problem space for determining a fair division 
is therefore relatively well-defined compared to cases of delayed exchange with a growing 
resource portfolio.  
Take the question of how much meat I deserve from you today in return for the fish I gave 
you last week. It will not receive a satisfactory answer if the need and availability of both 
resources can change quickly and unpredictably. Droughts, resource depletion, luck, and the 
(relative) number of resource providers can change in ways that make a good deal today 
seems like a bad one in a few weeks. The possibility for convergence on default norms is 
thus eroded by the temporally shifting nature of the problem. Recurring patterns of change 
such as seasonal fluctuations could in principle be covered by series of default norms, but 
this already becomes harder in combination with other (individually predictable) dimensions 
of change that range over different timespans. To the extent that default norms of exchange 
fail to adjust to fluctuations, they will increase tensions in trade rather than reduce them. The 
disadvantaged won’t recognize the norm as being about fairness and will be inclined to reject 
it. Hence, default norms neither enable nor sustain the challenges that are typical of the 
reciprocation crisis; they work for collaboration, but not for exchange. 
If default norms were not the solution, what did stabilize economies of exchange? If, as I 
have argued, fluctuations in supply and demand were the key problem, the simplest solution 
would have been to account for those fluctuations. That is, a shared recognition that shifts in 
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supply and demand should be reflected in the ratio of exchanged goods and services might 
have stabilized exchange-based economies. It could have prevented those economies from 
collapsing under the weight of accumulating grudges about unfairness among trading 
partners. However, as we saw in Section 4, reliably monitoring changes in supply and 
demand for a number of different commodities is a non-trivial task. Why think that late-
Pleistocene hominins could have pulled off something that I took to be a problem for 
hominins on Baumard et al.’s account?  
There are several differences between the account of Baumard and colleagues and the one 
I am starting from that make the idea of biological market effects less problematic and more 
promising in the present context. First, note that I am suggesting a role for biological markets 
late in hominin evolution. By this time hominins had already evolved considerably more 
advanced cognitive and motivational capacities than on Baumard et al.’s account of 
biological markets, which goes back to (at least) our common ancestor with great apes. Thus, 
on my picture, biological markets did not select for enhanced memory, mind-reading, and 
social monitoring abilities, but took off from a point where these were already in place; they 
had evolved from the antecedent demands of collaborative hunting and caring. Second, the 
late-Pleistocene trading environment was likely more structured and localized than for the 
primate baseline that Baumard et al. calibrate hominin markets to. It is likely that in the late-
Pleistocene resources were transported to and exchanged at central camp or feeding sites, 
which provided some information about the local state of supply and demand. Hypotheses of 
(non-human) primate biological markets instead have to work with demographically 
scattered and changing sites of exchange. Finally, I am not proposing that late-Pleistocene 
hominins traded resources in complex configurations and kept track of complex supply-and-
demand interactions between different combinations of commodities. As I argued in Section 
3, such complex markets would have surely been out of reach in the absence of robust price 
mechanisms and bookkeeping methods. But we can imagine simpler forms of market-based 
trade in which only certain pairs of resources are traded, and in which some resources are 
traded serially rather than in many (parallel) combinations.  
Adrian Jaeggi and colleagues have recently shown that market-based dynamics of this sort 
play an important role in exchange-based cooperation in the Tsimane’ forager-
horticulturalists of lowland Bolivia. In a comparison of exchanges across five commodity 
classes—meat, (garden) produce, labor, childcare, and sickcare—they showed that ‘some 
household-specific cooperation strategies were consistent with market forces, i.e. the costs 
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and benefits of giving and receiving given their own and others’ supply and demand’ (Jaeggi 
et al. [2016], p. 5). Importantly, they also found that the Tsimane’ do not trade all resources 
for each other, but only particular, linked commodity pairs. Hence, their economy is fully 
connected, but not complex and web-like in structure. Another interesting feature of the 
Tsimane’ exchange economy is that most trades are between varieties of material capital 
(meat for garden produce) or forms of social capital (labor for childcare, childcare for sick 
care) (Macfarlan [2016]). This suggests a (partial) solution to role- and resource-
incommensurability problem: in the main, only similar forms of wealth are traded for each 
other, making it easier to compare resources and agree on exchange rates.  
The Tsimane’ aren’t a perfect model for late-Pleistocene hunter-gatherers overall, but they 
are relevantly similar for our purposes. Since they live in relative independence from the 
larger Bolivian institutional-political system, they run an economy that is not governed by 
institutions and a judicial system that can enforce contracts. Their markets are much closer 
the biological, non-monetary bartering model than those of modern economic theory. If the 
reciprocation crisis constituted a real challenge, a restricted market-based economy similar 
in kind to that of the Tsimane’ might well have been part of the solution. 
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Hammerstein (eds), Economics in Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
146–72. 
 Bshary, R. and Grutter, A. S. [2002]: ‘Asymmetric Cheating Opportunities and Partner 
Control in a Cleaner Fish Mutualism’, Animal Behaviour, 63, pp. 547–55.  
Bshary, R. and Noë, R. [2003]: ‘Biological Markets: The Ubiquitous Influence of Partner 
Choice on the Dynamics of Cleaner Fish-Client Reef Fish Interactions’, in P. 
Hammerstein (ed.), Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, pp. 167–84. 
Bshary, R. and Schäffer, D. [2002]: ‘Choosy Reef Fish Select Cleaner Fish that Provide 
High-Quality Service’, Animal Behaviour, 63, pp. 557–64.  
Carter, G. [2014]: ‘The Reciprocity Controversy’, Animal Behavior and Cognition, 1, 368–
86. 
De Waal, F. B. M. [2000]: ‘Attitudinal Reciprocity in Food Sharing Among Brown 
Capuchin Monkeys’, Animal Behaviour, 60, pp. 253–61.  
Debove, S., André, J.-B. and Baumard, N. [2015]: ‘Partner Choice Creates Fairness in 
Humans’, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 282, pp. 1–7. 
Debove, S., Baumard, N. and André, J.-B. [2015]: ‘Evolution of Equal Division Among 
Unequal Partners’, Evolution, 69, pp. 561–9. 
Debove, S., Baumard, N. and André, J.-B. [2016]: ‘Models of the Evolution of Fairness in 
the Ultimatum Game: A Review and Classification’, Evolution and Human Behavior, 
37, pp. 245–54. 
Debove, S., Baumard, N. and André, J.-B. [2017]: ‘On the Evolutionary Origins of Equity’, 
PLOS One, 12, pp. 1–16. 
Biological markets, cooperation, and the evolution of morality 
 31 
DeScioli P. [2013]: ‘Does Market Competition Explain Fairness?’, Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 36, pp. 87–8. 
Dunayer, E. S. and Berman, C. M. [2016]: ‘Biological Markets: Theory, Interpretation, and 
Proximate Perspectives. A Response to Sánchez-Amaro and Amici (2015)’, Animal 
Behaviour, 121, pp. 131–6. 
Dugatin, L. A. [1997]: Cooperation Among Animals: An Evolutionary Perspective. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Forber, P. and Smead, R. [2015]: ‘Evolution and the Classification of Social Behavior’, 
Biology and Philosophy, 30, pp. 1–17. 
Frank, R. H, Bernanke, B., Antonovics, K., Heffetz, O. [2018]: Principles of Economics, 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Fraser, B. J. [2013]: ‘False Advertising in Biological Markets: Partner Choice and the 
Problem of Reliability’, in K. Sterelny, R. Joyce, B. Calcott, and B. Fraser (eds) 
Cooperation and its Evolution, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 153–73. 
Fruteau, C., Voelkl, B., van Damme, E. and Noë, R. [2009]: ‘Supply and Demand 
Determine the Market Value pf Food Providers in Wild Vervet Monkeys’, PNAS, 106, 
pp. 12007–12.  
Gabriele Schino, F. A. [2014]: ‘A Few Misunderstandings About Reciprocal Altruism’, 3, 
pp. 561–3. 
Gintis, H. [2015]: ‘What Is Unique About Human Thinking?’, BioScience, 65, pp. 441–4.  
Grutter, A.S. [1999]: ‘Cleaner Fish Really Do Clean’, Nature, 398, 672–3. 
Hammerstein, P. and Hagen, E. [2005]: ‘The Second Wave of Evolutionary Economics in 
Biology’, Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 20, pp. 604–9.  
Hammerstein, P. and Noë, R. [2016]: ‘Biological Trade and Markets’, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B, Biological Sciences, 371, pp. 1–
12. 
Jaeggi, A. V., Hooper, P. L., Beheim, B. A., Kaplan, H. and Gurven, M. [2016]: 
‘Reciprocal Exchange Patterned by Market Forces Helps Explain Cooperation in a 
Small-Scale Society’, Current Biology, 26, pp. 1–18.  
Kaburu, S. S. K. and Newton-Fisher, N. E. [2016]: ‘Markets Misinterpreted? A Comment 
on Sánchez-Amaro and Amici (2015)’, Animal Behavior, 119, pp. e7–13. 
Joeri Witteveen 
 32 
Kitcher, P. [2008]: ‘Ethics and Evolution: How to Get Here from There’, in S. Macedo and 
J. Ober (eds), Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, pp. 120–39. 
Macfarlan, S. J. [2016]: ‘Social Evolution: The Force of the Market’, Current Biology, 26, 
pp. R756–8. 
Noë, R. [2006]: ‘Cooperation Experiments: Coordination Through Communication Versus 
Acting Apart Together’, Animal Behaviour, 71, pp. 1–18.  
Noë, R. [2016]: ‘How Do Biological Markets Compare to the Markets of Economics?’,  
Munich Personal RePEc Archive, pp. 1–33. 
Noë, R. and Hammerstein, P. [1994]: ‘Biological Markets: Supply and Demand Determine 
the Effect of Partner Choice in Cooperation, Mutualism and Mating’, Behavioral 
Ecology and Sociobiology, 35, pp. 1–11. 
Noë, R. and Hammerstein, P. [1995]: ‘Biological Markets’, Trends in Ecology and 
Evolution, 10, pp. 336–39. 
Noë, R., Schaik, C. P. and Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. [1991]: ‘The Market Effect: An 
Explanation for Pay‐Off Asymmetries Among Collaborating Animals’, Ethology, 87, 
pp. 97–118. 
Noë, R., and Kiers, E. T. [2018)]: ‘Mycorrhizal Markets, Firms, and Co-ops’, Trends in 
Ecology and Evolution, 33, 777–89.  
Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund, K. [1992]: ’Tit for Tat in Heterogeneous Populations’, 
Nature, 355, pp. 250–53. 
Okasha, S. [2006)]: Evolution and the Levels of Selection. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rubinstein, A. [1982]: ‘Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model’, Econometrica, 50, pp. 
97–110.   
Sánchez-Amaro, A. and Amici, F. [2015]: ‘Are Primates out of the Market?’, Animal 
Behaviour, 110, pp. 51–60. 
Sánchez-Amaro, A. and Amici, F. [2016]: ‘Markets Carefully Interpreted: A Reply to 
Kaburu and Newton-Fisher (2016)’, Animal Behavior, 119, pp. e7–13. 
Schino, G. and Aureli, F. [2009]: ‘Reciprocal Altruism in Primates: Partner Choice, 
Cognition, and Emotions’, Advances in the Study of Behavior, 39, pp. 45–69.  
Schino, G. and Aureli, F. [2010]: ‘Primate Reciprocity and Its Cognitive Requirements’, 
Evolutionary Anthropology, 19, pp. 130–5. 
Biological markets, cooperation, and the evolution of morality 
 33 
Sheskin, M. and Baumard, N. [2015]: ‘Partner Choice and the Evolution of a Contractualist 
Morality’, in J. Decety and T. Wheatley (eds), The Moral Brain: A Multidisciplinary 
Perspective, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 35–48. 
Smith, A [1776]: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: 
W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 
Sperber, D. and Baumard, N. [2012]: ‘Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive 
Perspective’, Mind and Language, 27, pp. 495–518. 
Sterelny, K. [2012]: ‘Morality’s Dark Past’, Analyse and Kritik, 34, pp. 95–115. 
Sterelny, K. [2014]: ‘A Paleolithic Reciprocation Crisis: Symbols, Signals, and Norms’, 
Biological Theory, 9, pp. 65–77. 
Sterelny, K. [in preparation]: ‘Norms: Cooperation, Scale and Complexity’. 
Sterelny, K. [forthcoming]: Culture and Cooperation. Cambridge University Press. 
Tomasello, M. [2014]: A Natural History of Human Thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Tomasello, M. [2016]: A Natural History of Human Morality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Trivers, R. L. [1971]: ‘The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism’, The Quarterly Review of 
Biology, 46, pp. 35–57. 
West, S. A., Griffin, A. S. and Gardner, A. [2007]: ‘Social Semantics: Altruism, 
Cooperation, Mutualism, Strong Reciprocity and Group Selection’, Journal of 
Evolutionary Biology, 20, pp. 415–32. 
  
Joeri Witteveen 
 34 
Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1a: Light dots represent the proportion of proposers, dark dots the proportion of responders. 
The figure shows four ecological equilibria for populational states in which proposers on average 
share less than half of the benefits with responders (high prices). The less proposers share, the more 
they outnumber responders at ecological equilibrium. 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Light dots represent the proportion of proposers, dark dots the proportion of responders. 
The figure shows four ecological equilibria for populational states in which proposers on average 
share more than half of the benefits with responders (low prices). The more proposers share, the more 
they are outnumbered by responders at ecological equilibrium.  
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Figure 1c: Supply and demand “curves” (straight lines in this case) connect the levels of supply (the 
proportion of proposers) and the levels of demand (the proportion of responders) for each price point. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: In a population that starts at an ecological equilibrium of excess supply, selection in favor 
of slightly lower offers will drive the population toward the market equilibrium of supply and demand. 
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Figure 3: In a population that starts out at an ecological equilibrium of excess demand, selection in 
favor of slightly higher offers will drive the population toward the market equilibrium of supply and 
demand. 
 
 
 
 
